JAHODA ROBERT, GODAROVÁ JANA: Family policy in the Czech Republic: Redistribution of wealth through the child tax bonus. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2013, LXI, No. 7, pp. 2213-2220 Families with children are traditionally the target group of the social system in developed countries. This paper deals with one component of family policy in the Czech Republic, which is household entitlement. The main focus is on the child tax bonus (herea er CTB). The paper is divided into descriptive and methodological-analytical parts. The descriptive section provides basic information about the benefi ciaries of CTB. In the latter section we formulate research questions about the impacts and eff ects of CTB. We discover that the infl uence of tax instruments has grown in recent years. The amount of the tax bonus for children exceeded CZK 3 billion in 2009, with almost 22% of all households with children eligible. Although CTB is income-tested, its redistributive impact is rather small -approximately 80% of recipients cannot be considered as poor. Outcomes from our microsimulation model reveal that 82 to 86% households with CTB were at the same time modelled as eligible and therefore we can use microsimulation techniques for future analyses of policy change.
INTRODUCTION
The redistribution of income and wealth among individual members of society is a traditional goal of public sector policies. On the expenditure side, instruments for achieving this policy goal include the social security system and, on the income side, the tax system. These policies aim in theory to moderate market diff erences in the incomes of individual members of society. The actual policies, however, may provide aid to particular social groups, as well. Such groups include those of post-productive age, people with disabilities or migrants. A traditional group, and one to which we devote attention in this article, is households with dependent children.
In addition to general income support, this may aim at individual subgoals relating to the socioeconomic environment. One example is the issue of eligibility in which social benefi t instruments may be, but do not need to be, conditional on an income test. Another issue involves the type of support suitable for infl uencing household economic activity. These issues are interesting when they arise from the use of tax credits from standard taxation, labelled tax expenditures. The impact of tax credits comes under less detailed examination than does the impact of benefi t policy tools.
Together with Theveron (2011) we can sum up family policies as the following aims: to redistribute income due to increased cost, to reduce poverty, to improve natality or gender equity, to direct the education process and to increase (mostly mother's) labour participation. In our paper we focus mainly on the fi rst two mentioned aims. When we compare policy measures to support families across countries we can fi nd a rather wide variety of instruments. When we exclude services in kind, such as childcare, a good overview of fi nancial support can be found in OECD documents and statistics. For the setting up of family policies, see the OECD Family database, detailed information on family taxation child allowance can be found in the OECD (2011) . When it comes to forms of child allowance or family tax credits, these may diff er according to the main aim being followed. So we can fi nd universal or meanstested benefi ts, refundable or non-refundable tax reliefs. Both instruments are described down to the last detail in the OECD (2011) for all OECD countries.
These issues are a popular research topic in developed economies. The main research direction examines how diff erent 'family packages' infl uence the income situation of families and how eff ectively they reduce poverty. A discussion of the topic using empirical data may be found, for example, in Whiteford and Adema (2007) . Czech authors analysing the amount of support for households include Mitchell (2011) . She compares family packages in post-communist countries versus selected Western economies. The infl uence of governmental family packages in Central Europe is also the subject of an article by Svarcova and Svarc (2009) which examines the social situation of families and decisions about having children in the context of family fi nancial support. Mitchell (2011) looks at the issue of generosity using model households. Figari, Paulus and Sutherland (2011) , by contrast, employ microsimulation techniques using the EUROMOD model. They construct a novel support indicator based on both benefi t information and taxation instruments.
We can see a similar approach of negative income tax as a support to families with children, as in the Czech Republic, in the USA. The earned income tax credit (hereina er "EITC") was implemented in the mid-1970s and is now combined with child tax credit (hereina er "CTC"). Thus, if the amount of these tax credits (EITC+CTC) exceeds the tax before credits, it means the household receives a net payment from the government. This government support eff ectively targets assistance at low-income families with children. Hofman, Seidman (2003) works with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. In their article they remark that the number of families receiving EITC increased by about 26% between 1993 and 1996, when approximately 13% of households were eligible in the latter year. They argue that this expansion was driven mainly by the factor of the higher income eligibility level of families with two or more children. They focus on poverty issues too when they pay attention to near-poor families (income between 100 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line), claiming that these families received on average higher tax credit than poor families.
Holtz, Scholz (2003) monitor developments of EITC, discuss EITC participation and compliance, its eff ects on labour force participation and hours of work, marriage and fertility, skill formation, consumption and poverty. They conclude that between 1975 and 2000 the real EITC spending has increased eight times in the USA and the number of claimants has tripled. Ozawa, Hong (2003) are interested in the EITC program too. They use data from the Current Population Survey from 1999, which interviewed 132,324 individuals aged 14 and over, involving 57,325 families. Their work focuses on the eff ects of the number of children and of race on EITC and the combination of the eff ects of EITC and Child Allowance.
Quantifi cation of the relative eff ect of policy change compared to other changes for the UK and their New Labour program is discussed in Bargain (2012) . Using microsimulation techniques, he claims that the policy change has signifi cant impact on inequality and poverty.
The integration of welfare function and incentive function into the labour market can be found in the paper of Milligan, Stabile (2007) . In analyses of a new child tax credit program introduced in Canada they found that the tax credit program has strong incentive outcomes. They document it with the drop of social assistance recipients.
A similar methodological approach is employed in Kornstad, Thoresen (2004) . They use a taxbenefi t model calculation for the assessment of the distributional eff ects of means tested child benefi ts in Norway. They conclude that targeting is off set by the reduction of the (female) labour supply.
This article looks at tax support of families with children. Such support may take the form of a child allowance from basic income tax, as well as tax credits. In the Czech Republic (CR) in 2005 the child tax allowance was replaced by refundable tax credits. The amount of early credit for each child was signifi cantly increased in 2008 from CZK 6,000 to CZK 10,680. We believe it is worthy of analysis since it has become one of the most important redistributional tools aff ecting families with children. In keeping with OECD (2011) methodology, the refundable tax credit may take the form of a non-refundable tax credit supplemented by a tax bonus (herea er CTB) and therefore behave as negative income tax. A particular feature of the Czech system is that CTB is not counted as part of the income used for determining income-tested social benefi ts. In addition, households may only claim CTB if the total annual income of the person making the claim is at least six times the monthly minimum wage. This measure was adopted to encourage labour supply among low-income households. The maximum CTB which a family may claim is set at CZK 52,200, which is approximately 4.9 times the amount of refundable tax credit for a single child. We should add that, besides tax credit for a child, a family may be eligible for a child allowance, in the form of income tested benefi t: only families with little or no income are therefore eligible.
The goal of this paper is to discuss the eff ects of CTB on Czech households and to analyse problems which occur in the process of CTB modelling. At the same time we discuss problematic legal aspects of CTB.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
The authors make use of data from the EU-SILC, which stands for European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, a sample survey of the CR for 2009 and 2010. We believe that two datasets will eliminate the errors which might occur when only one dataset is used. At the same time we may see to what extent CTB redistribution changed from 2009 to 2010 in the situation of an unchanged legislative set-up. The EU-SILC database provides comparable, cross-sectional data on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions in the European Union. The sample of Czech households used in SILC contains approximately 10,000 households (for more on the EU-SILC survey methodology, see CZSO, 2011) .
The model is based on a simplifi ed form of the CR tax system. The procedure for calculating the tax bonus is done on the basis of Act No. 586/1992 Coll., on Income Taxes. We know from the results of a study carried out by the Ministry of Finance of the CR (Jareš, 2010: pp. 77-103,) that the value of some deductible items and tax credits is negligible compared with total tax revenue. The model therefore only uses deductible items for interest on housing loans and the following tax credits: basic credit (for individuals), tax credit for low-income spouses and child tax credit.
In view of this, our research is based upon a similar methodology employed in Figari, Paulus and Sutherland (2011) . Whereas these authors analysed a broader spectrum of instruments for various countries, with the goal of judging the impact of the instruments on family incomes and household income poverty, our own contribution focuses on a broader methodological framework for evaluating a single instrument, the Czech tax credit for children. Like the research of Figari, Paulus and Sutherland, our exploration is based on EU-SILC data. Using a basic statistical methodology, we show who the benefi ciaries of CTB are. We do not analyse non-refundable child tax credit since it is not recorded in the EU-SILC dataset. Later in the article, we use microsimulation technology to evaluate how the SILC data reported for CTB diff er from the claims we have calculated, and discuss the factors which underlie these diff erences. We suggest that the proposed sequence for complex family support analysis is the best option for our current and future research. Our conclusions rely on similar research into tax credits done in Great Britain by Clark and McCrae (2001) , which discusses techniques allowing for the fact that data input into the model underestimates actual credit recipient numbers. In the conclusion, the answers we received to these questions are used to evaluate the impact of CTB on Czech households. The suitability of microsimulation techniques for this evaluation is also assessed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter is divided into descriptive and methodological-analytical sections which conclude with a section discussing the main results. The descriptive section provides basic information about CTB benefi ciaries in the Czech Republic. In the methodological-analytical section, research questions to do with CTB impact are formulated.
Descriptive Section
This part of the article explores the distribution of CTB among households using several indicators: the number of children in the household, disposable household income, type of household and recipients of selected social benefi ts. Households receiving CTB were also tested for income poverty levels.
For purposes of comparison, let us here introduce the basic characteristics of the CR in relation to the CTB as given in the data recorded in the EU-SILC survey. Personal income tax revenue was CZK 129.4 billion in and, in 2010 billion. The total number of households in the CR (weight recalculation of the study sample) was 4.1 million. The total sum paid out in CTB in 2009 was CZK 3.4 billion. In 2010, this was reduced to CZK 3.0 billion, a reduction of 12%. The total number of children remained the same year-on-year (2.3 million children). In the tables below, the main fi ndings of the descriptive section of the paper are presented. Even though the number of children remained the same in 2010, it can be seen that the number of households receiving CTB dropped to 7.5%. Also visible is the fact that 75% of all paid-out tax bonuses were to families with one or two children (in both 2009 and 2010). Tab. III shows that the proportion of families with CTB to all families with children equated to 21 to 23% in 2009 and 2010.
A declining tendency is evident in the relationship between the amount of CTB and household disposable income. A year-on-year decline is also evident in CTB paid out virtually to all decile groups. Even families within the highest decile groups claim CTB. This is surprising because value of CTB is income dependent. It relates to the fact that the value of CTB is tested against the income of the claimant, not the family. Furthermore it is associated with the situation in which the partner with the lower income, usually the woman in the CR, claims tax credit for children. In the situation when the partner with higher income claims tax credit for children, the household does not receive any CTB because only the non-refundable part of tax credit is used against tax liability. In both situations net family income should be at the same value. For further explanation see Group E in Tab. V.
As already indicated, the amount of CTB depends mainly on the number of children and the income of the claimant. The maximum annual amount of CTB is set at CZK 52,200. When computing the CTB one should moreover take into account the mutual interaction of other tax allowances and tax credits as well as income tax rates. The amount of CTB depends not only on statistically observable variables but also on other social phenomena such as non-take-up. This article does not consider them, however.
In 2009, almost 17% of households with children receiving CTB were threatened by poverty. In 2010, the fi gure was almost 23%. These households represent 20% of the total CTB paid (25% in 2010). Table IV shows the absolute and relative frequency of households receiving both CTB and selected social benefi ts: child allowance, social supplement and social assistance benefi ts (the tax and benefi t supports for families with children are complementary). CZK 6 billion were paid out in 
Methodological-Analytical Section
As noted earlier, the model is based on EU-SILC data and Act No. 586/1992 Coll., on Income Tax. In our model and the survey data, households may be divided into eight groups using the CTB claim calculation indicator (in the model), the number of children (families with/without children) and the CTB recorded in EU-SILC. Mutual relationships between calculated and recorded claims for CTB and the existence of children may be found in Tab. V. Groups C and D cannot be created under the defi nition of CTB claims. They have been le in the table only for the purpose of providing a complete count of potential combinations.
A description of individual household groups and the quantifi cation of indicators for these groups is provided below.
Group A: households, consisting of approximately 6% of total households, which collect more than 80% of CTB. Given the amount of tax paid (approximately 1.5% of total tax revenues) it may be stated that these households are low-income, with CTB functioning as additional income.
Group B: makes up 6.7% (7.6% in 2010) of households. These households do not receive CTB but only tax credits for children. Some households in this group may have been so classifi ed because of problems to do with child records, as discussed in the chapter 4.
Group E: makes up approximately 2% of households. Problems with the model are most evident here, as discussed in the chapter 4, as is irrational behaviour by households. The parent with the higher income might not, as presumed in our model, claim the tax credit so no tax bonus would accrue. It would, instead, be claimed by someone with a lower income eligible for the tax bonus. These households spent 18% of the total CTB amount (14% in 2010).
Group F: 20% of households. These households do not receive CTB but only tax credits for children. These households tend to be higher-income, as testifi ed to by the relative share of tax paid (40%).
Group G: less than 1% of households. This group comes into being as a result of the fact that, during the survey period, children for which CTB was spent were adult, causing the model to show that the household should not have any entitlement to CTB. Because of the amount paid, the importance of this group is nevertheless negligible.
Group H: the largest group of households, comprising 65%. This group consists of households without children, who thus have no entitlement to CTB.
DISCUSSION
In this part of the paper we discuss the main fi ndings from previous sections and examine problems in the current set-up of CTB. We aim to come up with recommendations for law amendment and for future work.
Analysis has shown that over 20% of all households with children are eligible for CTB, with the greatest amount distributed to households with one or two children. The fact that the maximum amount of CTB per family is currently restricted by law seems to be an excessive restriction. As our analysis has indicated, doing away with this law would currently aff ect less than 1% of CTB recipients and annual budget costs could be considered as negligible. According to SILC microdata, there was only one household which received the maximum amount of CTB in SILC 2009 and none in SILC 2010.
If the tax benefi t for children is intended to pull this type of household into the labour market, we are of the opinion that it will be of minimal help, since the household groups receiving CTB and social assistance benefi ts or other income-tested benefi ts do not intersect to any signifi cant degree. The relevant passage in the law which excludes CTB income from the income test for these benefi ts is therefore redundant, and rescinding it would have only minimal eff ect on household incomes. At the same time, the system would be simplifi ed, with claims and the amounts distributed becoming more transparent.
Problems arise with the EU-SILC data in the modelling process, causing problems with the interpretation of results and in the model itself.
Our goal was to demonstrate the impact of changes to the law which exchanged the child tax allowance for tax credits for children in the form of nonrefundable tax credit, supplemented by a tax bonus for children. Other problems arise from classifying income monitored only as household totals, and not for individuals. Some incomes (taxed individually by withholding) tax may not be recorded in EU-SILC.
So far, we have identifi ed four salient facts. The fi rst is that CTB income is recorded retrospectively in the survey. Consequently, the household may have a diff erent composition from that which it had in the year of the survey. The second issue is that households of employees may spend the tax bonus on a monthly basis, amounting to one-twel h of the annual amount. Irregular income during the year may show up in the microsimulation model when the household has no entitlement to CTB, even if CTB was spent in the year in question. The third issue is that on the basis of the SILC survey data, we cannot properly evaluate a situation in which households had an entitlement to CTB based on income from the year preceding the survey and which was received only during the year of the survey, during which there was no entitlement to CTB. Finally, a real-world situation may arise in which a person in the household with a lower income spends CTB but in the microsimulation model the tax benefi t accrues to a person with higher income. This particular situation has no infl uence on the total household income, only on the division of income between individual household members. In all the above cases, we cannot satisfactorily explain the fact that the household receives CTB but, in the microsimulation model, should have no entitlement to it.
Conclusion
A tax bonus for children is one possible way in which the CR can support families with children. Although income tests for benefi ts primarily target the poorest families and have played an increasingly less signifi cant role since 1996, starting in 2005, with signifi cant change in 2008, the infl uence of tax instruments has grown -in particular, tax credits and tax bonuses for children.
In general, evaluating the impact of tax instruments for the support of families with children does not receive the amount of attention devoted to benefi t instruments. The goal of this paper has been to discuss the infl uence of the tax bonus for children which, as we have indicated, exceeded CZK 3 billion in 2008 and 2009. The conclusions of our analysis have been drawn from microdata from EU-SILC surveys. These demonstrate that something over 20% of all households with children are eligible to claim CTB, with the greatest amount spent by households with one or two children.
In spite of the fact that in contrast to the child allowance the CTB claim is not limited to the lowest deciles, households in the fi rst fi ve deciles share in it. That the CTB does not target the most impoverished group is evident in the fact that approximately 80% of benefi ciaries may not be considered impoverished households under the EU defi nition. At the same time, only 12% of benefi ciaries also received social benefi ts during the years under analysis, and only 1.2 to 1.8% of CTB benefi ciaries also collected social assistance benefi ts.
While examining the Italian experience with tax credits for dependent children, Gastaldi, Liberati (2009) formulate similar results in their paper as we do in our paper. According to their paper (1) a much simpler tax/benefi t system would achieve similar results as the present one, (2) the redistributive impact of tax credits toward poor families is poor.
The more comprehensive impact of the CTB was assessed with a microsimulation model. In this model, the group of households eligible for CTB is slightly diff erent from households which be eligible according to our calculations. Clark and McCrae (2001) pointed to similar problems in their research. Our paper analyses the main diff erences and discusses what infl uence they might have on future policy models. On the other hand, we would like to note the fact that the microsimulation model properly accounts for 81.7% (or 85.9%) of households in the 2009 or 2010 EU-SILC. The problems noted above are therefore not signifi cant in terms of the microsimulation model and further analysis of policy variants.
We plan to continue evaluating CTB in relation to the complex system of tax and benefi t instruments which support families with children. We would like to use the analysis of model households to show that the amount of legislative simplifi cation discussed above for CTB will have no negative impact on its functioning. We would also like to analyse the development of Czech support for families with children.
SUMMARY
Families with children are traditionally the target group of the social system in developed countries, and tax tools are one way for the state to support this group. This paper examines regular fi nancial state support, specifi cally the child tax bonus (herea er CTB), as part of the refundable child tax credit system. Although other elements of the welfare system for families have already been analysed, CTB remains unexplored. Our microsimulation model makes use of the data from the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) sample survey for the CR for 2009 and 2010, and is based upon a simplifi ed form of the CR tax system (Act No. 586/1992 Coll., on Income Taxes.). The goal of this paper was to discuss the infl uence of the tax bonus for children which, as we have indicated, exceeded CZK 3 billion in 2008 and 2009. Our analyses demonstrate that something over 20% of all households with children are eligible to claim CTB, with the greatest amount spent by households with one or two children. In contrast to the child allowance, another fi nancial support for families with children, the CTB claim is not limited to the lowest deciles. Still, approximately 80% of the total CTB is drawn by households in the fi rst fi ve deciles and it represents 3 to 6% of their disposable income. As well as a descriptive and analytical section our paper contains a methodological section, which is focused on problems with designing a microsimulation model and with the available data and identifi es the chief diff erences between the real situation and model results. Outcomes from our microsimulation model reveal that 82 to 86% of households with CTB were modelled as eligible and therefore we can use our model for future analyses of alternative family policies and their potential impact on public fi nance as well as individual households.
